Developed Speculation and Under Developed Markets - The Role of Futures Trading on Export Prices in Less Developed Countries by Fortenbery, T. Randall & Zapata, Hector O.
  University of Wisconsin-Madison 






              May 2004                                                                  Staff Paper No. 470   
 
 
 Developed Speculation and Under Developed Markets – The 














    










Copyright © 2004 T. Randall Fortenbery and Hector O. Zapata.  All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Developed Speculation and Under Developed Markets – The Role of Futures 




T. Randall Fortenbery  
and 


















Copyright 2004 by T. Randall Fortenbery and Hector O. Zapata.  All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by 




*  Fortenbery is the Renk Chair Professor of Agribusiness, Department of Agricultural 
and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin – Madison, and Zapata is a Professor, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University.Developed Speculation and Under Developed Markets – The Role of Futures 




This paper examines the relationship between New York coffee futures and cash export 
prices in Guatemala and Honduras.  Cointegration tests suggest that the futures market 
is serving its price discovery function, and provides a vehicle by which to manage the 
domestic price risk in export countries.  However, further analysis finds that as the 
percent of speculative open interest increases in the coffee futures market, price volatility 
increases.  This suggests that cash market price risk in exporting countries may actually 








Coffee exporting countries are currently in a state of crisis.  In February 2002 
world coffee prices were at their lowest levels since the 1930’s, matching the great hog 
price rout of 1998.  One difference, however, is that hog prices rebounded quickly, while 
coffee prices have remained near lows (Figure 1).    In addition, price risk for coffee 
appears greater in the smaller export countries than in the overall sector (Figure 2). 
Historically low coffee prices coupled with substantial price volatility puts less 
developed countries (LDCs) relying on coffee exports at risk.  The potential effects of not 
developing an effective price risk management program can be devastating.  However, 
selecting among various risk management strategies can be challenging.  The impacts of 
alternative risk management strategies have been debated for decades, and conclusions 
have often turned on researchers’ initial assumptions as to the primary objective of in-
country LDC policy makers.  Until the mid 1980’s the focus tended to be on various 
 
 
2supply management schemes for addressing price risk issues for LDCs.  Measures of 
producer and consumer welfare effects from these programs varied depending on overall 
policy objectives.  For example, in 1969 Massell assumed that the policy objective of 
LDCs was to completely stabilize prices, and that this could be achieved through the 
public management of stocks.  He concluded that a complete price stabilization policy 
would result in a gain to producers, but a loss to consumers.    
In 1981 Newberry and Stiglitz argued that complete stabilization was not feasible, 
and examined the impacts of reducing, but not eliminating, price volatility for export 
commodities.  They concluded that reducing price volatility also reduces producer 
incomes, while leaving consumers relatively unaffected.  The policy makers’ challenge 
was to determine whether lower producer incomes justified the overall reduction in price 
risk.  In other words, did the benefits of reduced price dispersion more than offset the 
costs of lower producer incomes? 
By the mid 1980’s, attention began to focus on alternative ways to manage export 
price risk.  In 1985 Gemmill compared the relative costs and benefits of managing buffer 
stocks with the direct use of forward contract arrangements by individual producers.  
Gemmill’s work is of particular interest because it looked at individual contract 
arrangements as an alternative to more common supply management schemes, and 
because coffee was one of the commodities studied.  He estimated both country-by-
country and total world costs and benefits associated with managing international buffer 
stocks.  Based on earlier work by Nguyen (1980), Gemmill estimated baseline costs 
associated with maintaining a buffer stocks program.   He then compared the results to 
the individual country and total market costs and benefits associated with individual 
 
 
3producer forward pricing.  The forward pricing “rule” (i.e., the amount of production 
priced in the forward market) was estimated in a mean/variance type model where an 
individual country’s export income variance was minimized given target levels of 
income.   
The research results varied across both commodities and countries.  In the case of 
coffee, Gemmill found that at the world level the total costs of maintaining a buffer 
stocks program was significantly higher than the benefits accrued.  Thus, he found 
forward trading to be a more cost-effective risk management strategy.  However, for 
three of the six coffee exporting countries examined forward contracting by domestic 
producers did not achieve as high a benefit-risk ratio as could be achieved with a local 
buffer stocks program.  He found forward contracting was more cost effective, but also 
resulted in less total risk reduction.  
Over the past several years LDCs appear to be moving away from supply 
management schemes and in the direction of market based solutions for managing price 
risk.  Morgan, Rayner, and Vaillant (1999) note that LDCs have enacted policy reforms 
that increase the attractiveness of forward contracts as a risk management strategy.  
Recent international agreements liberalizing trade make supply control policies 
unacceptable mechanisms, and market based strategies for risk reduction, including 
forward contracting and hedging in futures markets, are being increasingly considered as 
alternatives. 
2. LDC use of Futures Markets 
According to Morgan et. al, an important decision in LDC use of futures markets 
is determining whether LDCs should hedge in markets already in existence in developed 
 
 
4countries, or develop domestic futures markets.  They argue this decision turns on 
whether it is more cost-effective to use an established market and attempt to manage not 
only the price risk of the export commodity, but also the exchange rate risk between the 
developed country and the LDC, or whether the substantial costs associated with 
developing both the physical infrastructure and the regulatory and trading environment 
necessary to launch a successful exchange should be incurred in order to develop trade in 
futures contracts priced in the export country’s home currency.
1,2 
Gemmill’s 1985 research assumed that forward contracts were available and 
accessible to LDC producers.  To the extent forward contracts are available to LDC 
producers for the commodities he studied (sugar, coca, and coffee), they likely exist only 
because futures contracts for those commodities exist.  However, the futures contracts 
trade in developed countries, and are not priced in producers’ domestic currencies.  If 
forward contracts are actively offered to LDC producers, the contractor is promising to 
pay a specific price on a future date in local currency, and likely hedging the associated 
price risk in another currency.
3  In the case of many coffee-producing markets, the 
exchange rate risk cannot be hedged directly.  Thus, the strategy suggested by Morgan et 
al. of hedging both the commodity price risk and the exchange rate risk directly is not 
                                                 
1 The potential success of a locally developed exchange will also depend on the market’s ability to deliver 
sufficient volume to insure liquidity. 
 
2 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, some futures exchanges outside the United States (US) trade 
commodities priced in US dollars, and thus any exchange rate risks faced by traders in these markets is no 
different than if they traded the same commodity on a US futures exchange.  There are also several 
examples of non-US exchanges pricing futures contracts for various commodities in local currency.  
Examples include maize traded in South African dollars on the SAFEX, feeder cattle traded in reais on the 
Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange, canola traded in Canadian dollars on the Winnipeg futures 
exchange, and soybeans traded in yen on the Tokyo Grain Exchange.  The paper by Morgan et. al implicitly 
assumed that any futures exchanges developed in LDCs would price contracts in local currency.   
 
3 For a complete discussion of  simultaneously hedge commodity price, exchange rate, and export freight 




5available.  This might represent the most appealing case for developing a local futures 
market.  If exchange rate risk cannot be managed using market tools, it is likely that 
either there will not be a sizeable offering of forward price contracts, or the contract 
prices will be discounted to compensate for not only the straight basis risk, but also the 
exchange rate risk.
4  To the extent that that the decision criteria surrounding the 
development of a local futures market is a comparison of the costs of infrastructure 
development with the costs of exchange rate risk exposure, it would seem cases where 
exchange rate risk cannot be directly hedged would represent the most likely scenario 
favoring local exchange development.
5 
Perhaps, however, reasons exist for LDC exchange development even when the 
costs of exchange rate risk do not exceed the costs of local futures exchange 
development.  The implicit assumption of both Gemmill and Morgan et. al is that price 
transmission between the futures contract in a developed country’s futures market and 
cash prices in a LDC market is efficient.  Thus, the only reason to develop a domestic 
futures exchange in a LDC is to eliminate the exchange rate risk between futures and 
cash markets.  Some work, for example Bessler and Covey (1991),
6 have questioned 
efficient price transmission between futures and cash markets even in developed 
countries where both markets are traded in the same currency.  If cash and futures 
                                                 
4 By straight basis risk, we mean the possibility that the difference between two prices (say corn at the 
Chicago Board of Trade and cash corn prices in Iowa) may change in unanticipated ways.  This is the usual 
risk taken on by any hedger in return for eliminating risks associated with changes in general price levels. 
 
5 Exporters would still be exposed to, and need to deal with exchange rate risk, but a futures contract priced 
in local currency could provide more useful forward pricing opportunities for producers and smaller 
intermediate marketers whose cash transactions are in local currency.  If forward pricing arrangements are 
to be used to manage income stability (the objective addressed by Gimmel and Morgan et. al) then market 
agents must have access to either futures or forward cash markets. 
 
6 Bessler and Covey employed bivariate cointegration models to test for efficiency.  A later paper by Zapata 
and Fortenbery (1996) showed that rejection of bivariate cointegration might not justify a conclusion that 
two markets are inefficient in their exchange of information. 
 
 
6markets in developed countries are not always efficiently linked, it is not reasonable to 
assume futures prices in developed countries and cash markets in LDCs always 
efficiently interact. 
Further, even if the futures markets in developed countries and LDC cash markets 
are linked, it still seems possible that the existence of the developed countries’ futures 
contract may not improve price performance in the LDC.  In 1993, Witherspoon 
suggested that it was possible to have excessive speculation in a futures market, and in 
such a case the cash market might be destabilized by futures market price action.  If this 
occurs, hedging in the futures market may only reduce the price risk resulting directly 
from futures market activity, and not reduce the overall price risk inherent in a 
commodity’s cash market fundamentals.  If Witherspoon is right, the problem might be 
greatest in contracts like coffee, cocoa and sugar that tend to be relatively thin, and that 
have experienced a significant increase in the ratio of speculative to hedging activity in 
recent years (figure 3).
7 
If futures markets in developed countries and cash markets in LDCs are not 
efficiently sharing information, or if speculative activity in developed countries’ futures 
markets is increasing overall market price volatility, incentives may exist to develop 
                                                 
7 Figure 3 actually understates the percentage of speculative activity.  The Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission divides futures traders into commercial and non-commercial traders. All non-commercial 
traders are by definition speculators: they have no commercial interest in the cash markets. However, while 
all commercial traders have commercial interests in cash markets, it is not always the case that their 
positions are direct hedges of those cash positions. Once designated a commercial trader, all trades are 
reported as commercial open interest even if a firm engages in a purely speculative trade.  The ratio in 
Figure 3 also only accounts for activity by large, reportable traders.  To assume the ratio accurately 
represents the market as a whole implies assuming the ratio of speculative to hedged positions among the 




7domestic futures markets regardless of exchange rate risk levels.
8  A lack of efficient 
price transmission between the developed market and the LDC market implies the basis 
risk associated with hedging in a developed country’s market could still be unacceptable 
even if the source of the basis risk is not volatile exchange rates.  Further, if the level of 
speculative activity is increasing overall price volatility in the developed country’s 
futures market, and that volatility is being passed back to the LDC cash market, the LDC 
may have an incentive to develop a local futures contract for both domestic price 
discovery and as a vehicle from which to offer local forward cash contracts.
9      
Historically we have not thought much about the impact of speculative behavior 
on price action.  In fact, until a decade or so ago, it was simply assumed that the more 
traders in the market, the more efficient the market was at discovering price, regardless of 
the relative composition of speculators to hedgers.  However, the coffee market (like 
cocoa and sugar) is unique in that U.S. commercial traders have become both 
increasingly concentrated and more vertically integrated, potentially reducing their need 
for price risk management.  This may have resulted in LDCs representing a larger portion 
of the commercial volume, with total commercial activity falling as a percent of total 
market activity.   
                                                 
8 In the case of Honduras, for example, the standard deviation of the month-to-month rate of change in the 
exchange rate is 6.24 percent.  Note from figure 2 that this represents significantly less than half of the total 
cash price volatility for coffee.  Further, if the exchange rate risk were eliminated from the export coffee 
price, cash volatility would be about equal to futures price volatility.  If futures price volatility is increased 
as a result of speculative futures activity, the cash price volatility may be as well. 
 
9 In-country futures markets may increase market access and opportunities for local producers and 
merchandisers in several ways.  One, having contracts designed with delivery specifications more closely 
linked to the way cash market transactions take place in the local market could increase the value to local 
producers of forward price information.  Second, adjusting contract sizes to accommodate use by producers 
could increase an individual’s ability to control price risk.  An example is the feeder cattle contract traded 
in Brazil.  It is priced per animal (as opposed to cwt. in Chicago), and constitutes 33 animals (less than half 
a Chicago Mercantile feeder cattle contract based on average feeder cattle weights).  Further, the price 





The objective of this paper is to examine the relationships between the New York 
coffee futures market and cash markets in two Latin American LDCs.  In contrast to 
Morgan et. al, the intent is to determine if incentives might exist for LDC futures market 
development even when exchange rate risk is not the driving factor.  For example, if 
futures trading on a foreign exchange increases price risk in a LDC cash market (i.e., 
increases cash market price volatility), LDC policy makers may decide to encourage local 
exchange development in order to maximize access by domestic producers and 
merchandisers to futures market forward pricing opportunities as a vehicle for managing 
domestic income stability.  As such, the specific objectives here are to 1) determine 
whether the New York futures contract for coffee offers hedging opportunities for Latin 
American coffee market participants, and 2) examine the relationship between futures 
trade composition in New York and the volatility of coffee prices in Latin American cash 
markets.   
The first objective is addressed using cointegration analysis.  The issue is whether 
there is efficient information flow between the New York futures market and Latin 
American cash markets for coffee, and whether the basis risk associated with a hedge is 
less than the cash price risk faced by an un-hedged producer.
10  If the futures and cash 
markets are not cointegrated, it suggests that basis levels behave in a non-stationary way, 
and there is no guarantee that basis risk is less than actual cash price risk.   
                                                 
10 Contrary to some interpretations of cointegration results, we do not view the cointegration results as a 
test of overall market efficiency.  Rather, it is a test of relative price efficiency between the two markets.  
For our purpose, a rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegration implies that relevant information is 
getting priced similarly in both markets, suggesting that futures and cash markets are functioning in a 
manner that allows the futures market to be used as a risk management vehicle for cash market participants. 
 
 
9The second objective is tackled using a combination of a regression model that 
examines the impact of futures market composition on futures price volatility, and results 
from evaluating the residual behavior from the cointegration equations.  The results allow 
discussion of the potential impact of speculative market activity on futures volatility, and 
the extent to which futures market volatility corresponds to volatility in LDC cash 
markets. 
4. Data 
Data for the cointegration analysis span March 1990 through December 2001.  
Average monthly New York coffee futures prices and monthly export prices for 
Honduras and Guatemala were used.
11  Futures prices were collected from Commodity 
Research Bureau InfoTech data, and cash prices from the International Coffee 
Organization database.  All cash prices are dollar equivalents; in other words cash prices 
in local currency have been multiplied by the appropriate exchange rates to arrive at a 
monthly average export price in dollars.  The first observation coincides with the month 
the Honduran Lempira was decoupled from the dollar.  Prior to March 1990, the 
Honduran Lempira did not float.  The Guatemalan Quetzal has also floated over the 
entire sample period.
12  Since cash prices were only available on a monthly basis, the 
cointegration models utilize monthly data 
                                                 
11 The New York coffee contract began trading at the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (now part of the 
New York Board of Trade) in 1961.  The contract is for 37,500 pounds (250 bags) of coffee, and is priced 
in cents per pound.  Specifications call for physical delivery of washed arabica coffee.  This type coffee is 
produced in several Central and South American countries, as well as countries in Asia and Africa.  Coffee 
produced in Guatemala can be delivered against the contract at par, and Honduran coffee can be delivered 
at a 100 basis point discount.  Delivery locations include Exchange licensed warehouses in New York, New 
Orleans, Hamburg, Antwerp, and Miami.  Delivery outside of New York incurs a 1.25-cent per pound 
discount. 
 
12 Honduras and Guatemala were chosen because of their relative lack of market share in total coffee trade, 
but the importance of coffee exports in their overall trade portfolio.  Both countries represent very poor 
 
 
10The data used to address objective 2, impact of market composition on price 
volatility, span January 1992 through December 2001.
13  Price volatility measures are 
calculated as the standard deviation of period-to-period percentage price changes.
14  
These are calculated from the price data described above.  Data used to represent market 
composition come from the Commitment of Futures Traders reports released by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission each week.  The reports place traders in several 
categories, including non-commercial and commercial, long and short, percent of open 
interest represented by each trader type, and percent of open interest accounted for by the 
four largest traders who are long and the four largest traders who are short the market.   
5. Cointegration Methodology and Results 
Cointegration has become a standard technique for evaluating the relative 
performance of two related markets (Schroeder and Goodwin (1991), Zapata and 
Fortenbery (1996), Fortenbery and Zapata (1993, 1997)).  One reason for the popularity 
of cointegration analysis over the last decade is its ability to identify the long run 
equilibrium relationship between two markets, while allowing for deviations from the 
equilibrium relationship in the short run. 
According to Labys and Granger (1970), most commodity futures prices 
approximate stochastic processes, but that does not mean they are not pricing new market 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries in Latin America (and in fact the entire Western Hemisphere), and both rely heavily on 
agricultural exports for export income.  For example, agricultural exports represent 67 percent of total 
Guatemalan exports, with coffee, sugar and bananas being the primary commodities exported.  Honduras 
also relies primarily on agricultural exports for trade income generation, with coffee representing 45 
percent of total agricultural exports (CIA, 2002).  As such, both countries seem particularly vulnerable to 
impacts from trade in coffee futures markets.   
 
13 We were unable to acquire weekly futures trader data prior to 1992. 
 
14 To get weekly data, for example, daily percentage price changes were calculated as (lnPt – lnPt-1)*100, 
where P is the closing daily price and t is the current day.  Volatility in a given week is calculated as the 
standard deviation of percentage change in daily prices during the week.  
 
 
11information.  What it does mean is that it is difficult to anticipate what the new 
information is going to be, thus its impact on future prices, and that past prices are not 
good predictors of future prices. 
Cointegration does not address whether any individual market is pricing 
information correctly, but allows one to examine whether two different markets are 
pricing the same information similarly.  In a futures/cash market context, this price 
difference is called the basis.  Cointegration tests between futures and cash markets are 
measures of the extent to which basis is stationary.  If basis is stationary, its mean and 
variance do not change over time, suggesting information that changes the price in one 
market also changes the price in the other market, and that there is a stable long-run 
relationship between those price changes. 
Tests for cointegration in coffee prices were conducted via the maximum 
likelihood approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990).  They proposed that tests of 
cointegration should be based on a fully specified error-correction model (ECM).  The 
error correction model for series integrated of order one takes the form: 
1)   ∆Yt = Γ1∆Yt-1 + … + Γk-1∆Yt-k+1 + ∏Y
*
t-k + ∅D + et 
In this specification, et is NID (0,Λ), Γ1,…,Γk-1, ∏, ∅, Λ are parameters to be estimated, 
∆ = 1-L where L is the lag operator, D is a matrix of  non-stochastic variables (i.e., 
dummies, etc.), and t= 1,2,…,T.     
  Cointegration is tested by examining the rank of ∏.  If the rank of ∏ is zero, there 
is no cointegration, and no long run equilibrium relationship exists between the variables 
considered.  If the rank of ∏ is between zero and p, where p is the number of variables in 
the system, then there is cointegration, with the number of cointegrating relations defined 
 
 
12by the rank of ∏.  In testing for cointegration the hypothesis of interest is H0: ∏ = αβ′, 
where α and β are p x r matrices, β is the cointegrating vector, α is the weight vector that 
measures the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium, and r is the number of 
cointegrating relations. 
 To  estimate  β, all terms but β are eliminated from the likelihood function 
(Johansen, 1988): 
2)  ln L = -T/2 ln Ω-Σte′tΩ
-1et 
This is done by regressing ∆Yt and Yt-k on their lagged differences.  The Γ parameters are 
eliminated, and the resulting system has a dependent variable R0t (the residuals from a 
regression of ∆Yt on lagged ∆ Yt’s) and independent variable Rkt (the residuals from 
regressing Yt-k on lagged ∆Yt’s).   Next, letting Sij = T
-1ΣtRitRjt, i,j = 0,1, and assuming β 
known and estimating α by: 
     ^ 
3)  α = -S01β(β′S11β)
-1 
 
the likelihood becomes 
4)  ln L = (-T/2) ln Ω(β) 
with 
         ^ 
5)  Ω(β) = S00 – S01β(β′S11β)
-1β′S10 
 
The likelihood function is maximized by choosing β to be the first r eigenvectors 
of the determinantal equation (4) that correspond to the r largest canonical correlations (λi).  
The value of the likelihood function is: 
          ^ 
6)  ln L = -(T/2){ΣI ln(1-λI), +lnS00}, i=1,2,…,r 
 
A likelihood ratio test ( the Trace test) for at most r cointegration vectors takes the form: 
 
 
13  7)  -2 ln Q = -TΣI ln(1-λI),      i=r+1,…,p 
Johansen and Juselius also recommend using a λMAX statistic to test for cointegration.  
This is the same as the Trace test except that it evaluates maximum eigen values only.  
Tabulated critical values for the Trace test and λMAX test are presented in the 
appendices of Johansen and Juselius.   
The dynamics of the coffee market are examined by estimating the cointegration 
relationships between the New York futures market for coffee and the cash markets in 
Honduras and Guatemala.  The error-correction term in equation 1, ∏Y
*
t-k, includes a 
constant so that the partial equilibrium relationship between futures and cash prices is 
properly modeled, and the critical values of the Trace and λMAX are chosen accordingly. 
The lag-length of the error-correction model (ECM) is chosen by sequentially testing lags 
in a VAR in levels (up to maximum of 10 lags) and using a modified likelihood ratio test 
to select the appropriate lag (Sims, 1980).  The ECM is estimated at the optimum lag 
length and the residuals tested for autocorrelation to assure model adequacy.  Impulse 
response functions (Lukepohl, 1993) are estimated for the ECM with the cointegrating 
restrictions imposed (Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992). 
Table 1 provides the cointegration results between the export countries considered 
and the New York futures market.  Results are based on the specification outlined in 
equation 1, with coffee futures prices and export cash prices as k1 and k2.   In general, 
there is a finding of cointegration, suggesting the futures and cash markets do respond to 
the same information sets, and basis is indeed stationary.  Note, however, the relatively 
long lags between price changes in the futures market and associated changes in the cash 
markets.  Perhaps even more surprising is the difference in response time across the two 
 
 
14cash markets.  In Guatemala futures price changes are completely reflected in the cash 
export price within two months.  While this is much timelier than Honduras, it is still 
quite slow relative to information transmission in most measures of cointegration 
between domestic U.S. cash and futures markets.  For example, in their study of U.S. 
corn and soybean markets, Fortenbery and Zapata (1973) found that futures price changes 
were completely reflected in cash prices within in 1 to 3 days.
15  The Honduran coffee 
market takes up to six months to completely respond to coffee price changes in the New 
York futures market.  
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the impulse response functions from the two different 
models (one with Honduras cash prices and one with Guatemalan cash prices).  The top 
panel in figure 5 shows the response of New York futures prices and Honduran export 
prices to a one-time shock in futures prices.  Both series reveal a positive and immediate 
impact.   They rise during the first few months, and then settle at a new equilibrium 7-8 
months later.  The initial response in Honduran export prices is steeper than that for 
futures prices.  In contrast, shocking the Honduran export price (bottom panel of figure 5) 
results in a totally different price response.  Honduran export prices initially respond 
positively to a shock in their own price but quickly decline to an equilibrium level that 
coincides with the equilibrium level for the New York futures price.  Futures prices 
reveal only a minor response to a shock in Honduran export prices.   
In the case of Guatemala, the cash price response to a shock in the New York 
futures price is identical to the response in Honduras but the impulse response appears as 
a monotonically increasing function that settles at a new equilibrium slightly above the 
                                                 
15 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, it would be interesting to examine coffee price dynamics using 
daily data, and thus be able to make a direct comparison to the results of Fortenbery and Zapata.  
Unfortunately, however, we were unable to acquire daily export price data. 
 
 
15equilibrium of the Honduran export price.  When the Guatemalan export price is shocked  
the response of the New York futures price is flat and close to zero.  Guatemalan export 
prices decline quickly and almost monotonically, but remain positive throughout the 
adjustment period until they settle at basically the same equilibrium level that the futures 
prices do.  It appears from the impulse responses that New York futures prices have a 
strong effect on Honduran and Guatemalan export prices, and that these prices settle at a 
new equilibrium level following a change in futures price.  However, futures prices show 
only a minimal reaction to changes in either cash price series. 
Tests for ARCH effects in the model residuals suggest that not only are price 
levels  in Guatemala and Honduras affected by changes in futures prices, but cash price 
variances are also affected by futures market price activity.  ARCH tests reveal 
significant (5% level of significance) ARCH(6) and ARCH(2) effects from the residuals 
of the futures price ECM models for Honduras and Guatemala, respectively.
16 
Based on traditional interpretations of cointegration tests, one might conclude that 
the coffee markets are relative price efficient, that the futures market leads the cash 
market in price discovery, and that using the New York coffee futures contract as a hedge 
vehicle would result in a reduction of price risk for the coffee exporting countries 
considered.   
Efficiency is a confounding concept, however.  The cointegration results only tell 
us that the two markets share information, and that they price the information similarly.  
However, if a futures market is to enhance overall market performance, it should not 
impose additional risks on cash market participants.  In the case of first moments (i.e., 
                                                 
16 Both futures market equations revealed significant ARCH effects, as well as the cash equation for 
Honduras.  Only the Guatemalan cash price equation revealed no ARCH effects.  The specific test results 
are available from the authors. 
 
 
16price levels) we know from the cointegration impulse response functions that the New 
York coffee futures market is serving as the point of initial price discovery, and that the 
cash markets considered are responding to the futures market price changes.  As such, 
average prices in both markets are linked.  Further, the detection of ARCH behavior in 
the futures price equations suggests that cash price variances are also impacted by futures 
market activity.  What we do not know is whether overall price risk in the cash markets is 
increased, decreased, or unaffected by trading activity in the futures market.  If it is 
decreased or unaffected, then the futures market serves as a total price risk reducing 
vehicle, and a strong argument can be made that it enhances overall market performance.  
From a policy perspective, this suggests that use of the foreign futures market to hedge by 
any part of the LDC coffee sector likely reduces overall sector income instability relative 
to no LDC hedging activity.  
However, if futures market activity increases instability in cash prices, the case is 
less clear.  To be of net benefit, the futures market would need to provide hedgers with 
full coverage of the risk introduced by the futures market itself, and also reduce some part 
of the price risk that would exist in the cash market in the absence of futures.
17  In 
addition, cash market participants who do not directly hedge (small scale producers, 
merchandisers unable or unwilling to fund a margin account in foreign currency, etc.) 
would need access to other forward market opportunities, or income instability in the 
                                                 
17 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, if futures market activity affects volatility in both cash and 
futures markets in a similar fashion, optimal hedge ratios do not change, and market agents who hedge 
enjoy the same level of risk protection as would be the case if futures activity did not adversely impact 
volatility (this of course assigns a minimal cost to the potential for increased activity in the futures margin 
account).  However, for market agents unable to hedge on a foreign futures exchange, an increase in price 
volatility increases their price risk, and if there is not a local mechanism for managing this increased risk, 
an LDC policy makers ability to rely on market contracts (as suggested by Gimmel and Morgan et. al) as a 
part of an income stabilization policy is compromised.   
 
 
17coffee sector could actually be higher than it would be without a futures market at all 
regardless of whether some market agents hedge.   
6.  Trader Composition Tests 
If Witherspoon’s hypothesis is correct, and excessive speculation in the futures 
market results in increased cash price volatility even in markets that are cointegrated, 
then LDC policy makers need not only be worried about whether a developed country’s 
futures market provides hedging opportunities to LDC producers/exporters, but also 
whether trade activity in the developed futures market impacts cash price risk and 
adversely affects market participants not able to hedge on a foreign futures exchange. 
Figure 3 reveals that the percent of total speculative activity in the New York 
coffee contract has been increasing.  The ratio of non-commercial to commercial open 
interest has gone from consistently less than 30 percent to in excess of 50 percent.  
Further, while we do not have data that break down daily volume between commercial 
and non-commercial traders, it appears total volume has been increasing (Figure 4).  
Interestingly, as both volume and the percentage of open interest accounted for by 
speculators have increased prices have fallen.  However, this may simply represent 
informed and skilled speculation, with reduced commercial trade activity indicating 
commercial buyers expect yet lower prices and are thus not aggressively hedging.   
If speculators tend to be technical traders, meaning they generate their price 
expectations purely from past price action and trade volume, and do not monitor or 
account for underlying fundamental supply/demand conditions in the markets they trade, 
they may simply be noise traders, and generating trade decisions based on noise may 
exacerbate the level of market noise.  Put simply, if prices falling over a number of days 
 
 
18leads speculators to believe that prices will continue to fall, they may become aggressive 
sellers, pushing the market to even lower levels, when in fact a careful analysis of market 
fundamentals would lead one to believe price should go no lower.  When fundamentals 
finally impact price levels, prices rebound, but the resulting trading range is greater than 
would be the case if no noise trading occurred.   
To test the relationship between speculative activity and volatility in coffee 
markets, we use weekly data to estimate the following model: 
8)     
price trdrs trdrl
NCOISP NCOIS NCOIL FUTVOL
t t





4 4 β β β
β β β α
+ +





FUTVOLt is futures volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the percent change in 
daily prices for a given week,  NCOILt-1 is the percent of open interest accounted for by 
long non-commercial traders as of Friday the previous week, NCOISt-1 is the percent of 
open interest accounted for by short non-commercial traders the previous week, 
NCOISPt-1 is the percent of open interest accounted for by non-commercial spread traders 
the previous week, 4trdrlt-1 is the percent of total long open interest accounted for by the 
four largest traders the previous week, 4trdrst-1 is the percent of total short open interest 
accounted for by the four largest short traders the previous week, and price is the nearby 
weekly average New York futures price.  
As noted earlier, the model above clearly understates speculative activity since it 
does not account for speculative positions held by non-reporting traders, or speculative 
activity by commercial traders.  As such, it measures the lower limit of speculative 
 
 
19impacts on price volatility.  The results of estimating equation 8 are presented in Table 
2.
18 
Note that the impact of noncommercial traders on futures price volatility is 
significant.  Further, because of the recursive nature of equation 8, it appears that changes 
in market composition are followed by changes in price volatility.  Increases in both the 
percent of total long open interest and the percent of total short open interest accounted 
for by speculators is followed by increased price volatility in the futures market.  An 
increase in non-commercial spreading also appears to result in increased futures price 
volatility.  In addition, the futures price is significant suggesting that price risk increases 
as prices increase.    
The market share of the largest traders does not affect the level of market 
volatility.  Neither the long nor short four-trader concentration is significant in equation 
8.   
Combining the evidence from Table 2 with the detection of ARCH effects in the 
futures price equations earlier provides evidence that the level of futures market 
speculation may impact cash price volatility.  Specifically, the more speculators dominate 
trade activity in the New York coffee futures market, the greater the cash price volatility 
faced by LDC coffee market agents.  This provides a challenge to LDC policy makers 
interested in using forward contracting as a vehicle in stabilizing agricultural sector 
incomes in coffee producing countries.  For market agents sophisticated and large enough 
to hedge directly on a foreign futures exchange, hedging will likely reduce overall price 
                                                 
18 The results of unit root tests for the price series used in the cointegration analysis earlier confirmed the 
existence of a unit root in monthly average futures prices.  We also fail to reject the existence of a unit root 
in weekly average prices used in this analysis.  However, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the 
residuals from equation 8 is rejected at the 1 percent level.    
 
 
20risk.  However, for a large part of the LDC population, opportunities to hedge directly on 
foreign exchanges may not exist.  If this group represents a large enough share of the 
LDC coffee sector, sector-wide incomes may be less stable than if there were no coffee 
futures market at all.  For LDC policy makers focused on income stability, providing 
access to price risk management opportunities for all sector participants will be critical to 
reducing income instability.  One potential option is to develop a local futures exchange.  
Critical to the success of any local futures exchange, however, will be the ability to 
generate sufficient volume to insure a liquid market.           
7.  Conclusions 
Empirical evidence suggests that the New York coffee futures market currently 
serves as the center for price discovery in Latin American coffee exporting countries.  
Further, the failure to reject cointegration between the futures and cash markets 
considered suggests that the futures contracts in New York offer hedging opportunities to  
coffee sector participants in Central America.  The long adjustment period between 
futures and cash price changes does suggest that hedging may only be risk efficient for 
relatively long planning horizons. 
While the coffee futures market appears to offer risk management opportunities to 
participants in the cash market, it also appears that increased speculative activity 
increases the price risk faced by cash market participants.  For hedgers this my not be 
important, but for small producers and merchandisers unable to access a foreign futures 
exchange (either because of scale of operation or because of an inability to establish and 
manage a margin account in the US), overall risk exposure may increase as speculative 
activity increases in the futures market.  As such, it is not clear whether a locally 
 
 
21important product trading on a foreign futures exchange provides the environment 
necessary to stabilize local incomes through market based contracting, even ignoring 
exchange rate risk. 
Earlier work has suggested that hedging provides an alternative to supply 
management strategies in managing price risk for export commodities in LDCs, and 
therefore a strategy for stabilizing domestic incomes.  It was further argued that the 
choice between hedging a LDC export commodity on an established exchange in a 
developed country or developing a local futures contract priced in the domestic currency 
hinged on a comparison of the relative costs of either managing exchange rate risk 
through a direct hedge, or incurring exchange rate risk when local currencies are not 
represented by traded futures, with the relatively high costs of developing the 
infrastructure and regulatory environment necessary to develop a successful local futures 
market.  The research here suggests that there are additional costs to consider.  We show 
that even when exchange rate risk does not negate the risk management benefits from 
using a foreign futures contract, other costs may exist.  If activity in the foreign futures 
market has a destabilizing impact on LDC cash prices, additional incentives exist to 
develop local trade environments.   
The development of local LDC futures exchanges can mitigate the exchange rate 
risk faced by direct hedgers, may transmit price changes from futures to local cash 
markets more quickly if the current time lags are a result of frictions in information flow 
from New York to LDC cash markets, and increase access to forward pricing 
opportunities for that segment not able to hedge directly on a foreign futures exchange.  
However, generating sufficient trade volume will be critical to the success of a local 
 
 
22futures exchange.  Neither the work here nor the previous work cited here has addressed 
this important topic directly.   
Note that this paper does not conclude that excessive speculation exists in the 
coffee market, but does provide some initial evidence pointing in that direction.  Before 
definitive recommendations can be made relative to LDC development of local futures 
markets, three points need further clarification.  First, a specific test of variance causality 
between futures and cash prices needs to be considered and tested.  While we find 
correlation between futures market composition and cash price volatility, we do not 
explicitly test for causality in variance, a subject of future research.  Second, perhaps 
using Witherspoon’s theoretical formulation, explicit tests need to be conducted to 
determine the optimal threshold of speculative activity.  At what point does the 
speculative/commercial trade interest become unbalanced, resulting in excessive 
speculation?  Third, if a market is determined to be experiencing excessive speculation, 
one must determine that any policy choices focused on addressing the problem (such as 
speculative position limits, limits on concentration by individual traders, etc.) do not 
impose costs that exceed the cost of excessive speculation.  For example, restrictions on 
speculative activity that result in a significant reduction in market liquidity may impose 
costs that exceed those associated with too much speculation.  The above three points are 
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Table 1.  Unit-Root and Cointegration Tests, Futures and Selected Cash Markets for            
Coffee, March 1990 – December 2001. 
Series Unit-Roots  Cointegration  Tests 
  












Futures (NY)  1           -0.90**             
Guatemala  1            -1.15**  2  28.98  31.14  0.01  0.23   
Honduras  1            -2.09**  6  34.20  34.20  0.57  0.91   
**  Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Note: Unit-roots statistics calculated using Phillips-Perron “t-type” tests at truncation lag (LAG) for a 
model with a constant but no trend.  In cointegration Tests block, LAG is the number of lags in the ECM 
using a modified LR-test on a levels representation of the model. Johansen and Juselius tests for the null of 
no cointegration are L-max and Trace with 10% critical values of 10.29 and 17.79, respectively. The 
Ljung-Box (L-B) and LM test p-values for no autocorrelation are given on the last two columns.  Bivariate 
ECMs between futures and each of the cash series are for the cointegration tests.  For instance, the λmax 
rejects no cointegration between New York futures and Guatemalan cash prices. ARCH(6) and ARCH(2) 
for Honduras and Guatemala, respectively, were significant, lending support to variance effects. Only the 
cash price equation for Guatemala did not have ARCH effects in the residuals from the ECM. 
 
Table 2.  Regression Results from Equation 2.
1 
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic 
Constant -1.7535  -1.6503 
New York Futures Price**  0.0130  4.2894 
Noncommercial Long Open Interest ( %)**  0.0478  2.4858 
Noncommercial Short Open Interest (%)**  0.0598  3.1479 
Noncommercial Spread Open Interest (%)*  0.0957  1.9218 
Largest Four Long Trader Open Interest  -0.0076  -0.1959 
Largest Four Short Trader Open Interest  0.0318  1.4616 
1Initial OLS estimation revealed autocorrelation. The data was transformed via Cochran-Orrcut, and the 
model re-estimated. Adjusted R
2 = .207 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 




Figure 1.  Nearby coffee futures prices. 
in monthly coffee prices, 1990-2001.  
Rate of change is (lnPt – lnPt-1)*100, and volatility is the standard deviation of rate of change over the 
revious 12 months.  





























































































































































































































































































27Figure 3.  Noncommercial to commercial open interest and nearby price – New York   
coffee f
                                   
utures. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Figure 5.  Impulse response functions for Honduras. 



































































29Figure 6.  Impulse response functions for Guatemala. 
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